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We adopted an intersectional stereotyping lens to investigate whether race-based size bias—the tendency to judge Black men as larger than White men—extends to adolescents. Participants judged Black boys as taller than White boys, despite no real size differences (Studies 1A and 1B), and even when boys were matched in age (Study 1B). The size bias persisted when participants viewed computer-generated faces that varied only in apparent race (Study 2A) and extended to perceptions of physical strength, with Black boys judged as stronger than White boys (Study 2B). The size bias was associated with threat-related perceptions, including beliefs that Black boys were less innocent than White boys (Study 3). Finally, the size bias was moderated by a valid threat signal (i.e., anger expressions, Studies 4A and 4B). Thus, adult-like threat stereotypes are perpetrated upon Black boys, leading them to be erroneously perceived as more physically formidable than White boys.

 

Past research has demonstrated a link between facial expressions and mind perception, yet why expressions, especially happy expressions, influence mind attribution remains unclear. Conducting four studies, we addressed this issue. In Study 1, we investigated whether the valence or behavioral intention (i.e., approach or avoidance) implied by different emotions affected the minds ascribed to expressers. Happy (positive valence and approach intention) targets were ascribed more sophisticated minds than were targets displaying neutral, angry (negative-approach), or fearful (negative-avoidance) expressions, suggesting emotional valence was relevant to mind attribution but apparent behavioral intentions were not. We replicated this effect using both Black and White targets (Study 2) and another face database (Study 3). In Study 4, we conducted path analyses to examine attractiveness and expectations of social acceptance as potential mediators of the effect. Our findings suggest that signals of social acceptance are crucial to the effect emotional expressions have on mind perception. 

Inferring humans’ complex emotions is challenging but can be done with surprisingly limited emotion signals, including merely the eyes alone. Here, we test for a role of lower-level perceptual processes involved in such sensitivity using the well-validated Reading the Mind in the Eyes task. Over three experiments, we manipulated configural processing to show that it contributes to sensitivity to complex emotion from human eye regions. Specifically, inversion, a well-established manipulation affecting configural processing, undermined sensitivity to complex emotions in eye regions (Experiments 1-3). Inversion extended to undermine sensitivity to nonmentalistic information from human eye regions (gender; Experiment 2) but did not extend to affect sensitivity to attributes of nonhuman animals (Experiment 3). Taken together, the current findings provide evidence for the novel hypothesis that configural processing facilitates sensitivity to complex emotions conveyed by the eyes via the broader extraction of socially relevant information. 

We investigate how people’s ‘humor style’ relates to their online photo-sharing behaviors and reactions to ‘privacy primes’. In an online experiment, we queried 437 participants about their humor style, likelihood to share photo-memes, and history of sharing others’ photos. In two treatment conditions, participants were either primed to imagine themselves as the photo-subjects or to consider the photo-subjects’ privacy before sharing memes. We found that participants who frequently use aggressive and self-deprecating humor were more likely to violate others’ privacy by sharing photos. We also replicated the interventions’ paradoxical effects – increasing sharing likelihood – as reported in earlier work and identified the subgroups that demonstrated this behavior through interaction analyses. When primed to consider the subjects’ privacy, only humor deniers (participants who use humor infrequently) demonstrated increased sharing. In contrast, when imagining themselves as the photo-subjects, humor deniers, unlike other participants, did not increase the sharing of photos. 

Five experiments investigate the hypothesis that heavier weight individuals are denied mental agency (i.e., higher order cognitive and intentional capacities), but not experience (e.g., emotional and sensory capacities), relative to average weight individuals. Across studies, we find that as targets increase in weight, they are denied mental agency; however, target weight has no reliable influence on ascriptions of experience (Studies 1a–2b). Furthermore, the de-mentalization of heavier weight targets was associated with both disgust and beliefs about targets’ physical agency (Study 3). Finally, de-mentalization affected role assignments. Heavier weight targets were rated as helpful for roles requiring experiential but not mentally agentic faculties (Study 4). Heavier weight targets were also less likely than chance to be categorized into a career when it was described as requiring mental agency (versus experience; Study 5). These findings suggest novel insights into past work on weight stigma, wherein discrimination often occurs in domains requiring mental agency.

 

We tested the novel hypothesis that the dehumanization of prisoners varies as a function of how soon they will be released from prison. Seven studies indicate that people ascribe soon-to-be-released prisoners greater mental sophistication than those with more time to serve, all other things being equal. Studies 3 to 6 indicate that these effects are mediated by perceptions that imprisonment has served the functions of rehabilitation, retribution, and future deterrence. Finally, Study 7 demonstrates that beliefs about rehabilitation and deterrence may be the most important in accounting for these effects. These findings indicate that the amount of time left on a prison sentence influences mind ascription to the incarcerated, an effect that has implications for our understanding of prisoner dehumanization.